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The Battle over Plant Genetic Resources: Interpreting
the International Treaty for Plant Genetic Resources
Katie Bass*
Abstract
Internationallaw isfull of holes, inconsistencies, and ambiguities because of the number of
overlapping treaties, agreements, and actors at play. One such ambiguity can be found in the
overlapping system of treaties thatgovern plantgenetic resources. Specifically, the International
Trealyfor Plant Genetic Resources (ITPGR)providesfor internationalsharingofplantgenetic
resources to protect the biodiversiy necessaryfor humanfoodproduction. However, the ITPGR
is a non-binding trealy that is challenging to implement in light of internationaltreaties that
allow plantgenetic resources to be claimed as intellectualproperly rights. ITPGR is not as a
matter of law in conflict with either the InternationalUnionfor the Protection of New Varieties
of Plants (UPOV) or the Agreement on Trade RelatedAspects of IntellectualPropery Rights
(TRIPS), the two relevant intellectual properly treaties. However, there are inherent and
fundamental tensions between them. First,the treaties are pursuing different goals that are at
odds. Second, the ITPGR explidty bans claiming intellectualproperyrghts on 'geneticparts
and components, in the form received"from the MultilateralSystem which is designed to share
plantgenetic materialsinternationally.Depending upon how a nation interprets ITPGR's ban,
it could be inconsistent with the total control ofplant genetic materials allowed under UPOV
and TRIPS. This Commentproposes interpretationsof ambiguousprovisions in the ITPGR as
a guidefor nations that are tgTing to implement it but are bound by obligations under TRIPS.
The ITPGR phrase 'geneticpartsand components" should be interpretedto mean any segment
ofplantgenetic materialthat can befound in its entirely in the MultilateralSjystem. This would
require that plant producers alter the composition of genetic materials to be able to claim
intellectualproperly over them. This Commentfurther suggests that 'in the form received" can
and should be interpreted broadly to include simple variations on MultilateralSystem plant
genetic resources to betterprotectfarmersfrom accidentalencroachment. Finally, it argues that
payments made to ITPGR could be put to theirhighest use by providing legal representationfor
farmers.
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1. INTRODUCTION
There is an inherent tension between the purposes of the International
Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGR)'-which
fundamentally protects the availability of plant genetic resources for farmingand the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants
(UPOV) and Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) 2 -intellectual property (IP) treaties protecting the rights of plant genetic
material producers. Because of this tension, member nations that are bound by
TRIPS might encounter difficulty when trying to incorporate ITPGR into national
law.
Consider an example from Brazil: in 2000, Brazil and Switzerland were both
subject to TRIPS.' Neither country had signed, let alone ratified, the ITPGR.4 A
Brazilian not-for-profit organization, the Brazilian Association for the Sustainable
Use of Amazonian Biodiversity, transferred 10,000 micro-organisms from the
Amazon to a Swiss company without consent from the Ministry of the
Environment.' This transfer gave the Swiss company, Novartis, the right to patent
those genetic materials that came from the Amazon rainforest; TRIPS ensured
that both nations offered the necessary intellectual property protections. 6 Various
members of civil society and government objected to this transfer after it was
completed, arguing that Brazil did not retain enough benefits or protection for
traditional uses of the organisms transferred.' Had Brazil signed and ratified the
ITPGR at the time, many of the plant genetic materials transferred would have
I
2

Some literature quoted refers to this treaty as ITPGRFA. See International Treaty on Plant Genetic
Resources for Food and Agriculture, Nov. 3, 2001, 2400 U.N.T.C. 303 [hereinafter ITPGR.
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV), March 17, 1995, 1861
U.N.T.S. 281, availableat http://www.upov.int/portal/index.html.en; Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197.

3

See
Frequently Asked Questions about
TRIPS
WORLD
TRADE
ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/trips-e/tripfq-e.htm#Who%27sSigned (last visited Feb.
7, 2015); Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif e/org6_e.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).

4

Since then, both countries have signed and ratified the ITPGR, supra note 1. BRA, THE
INTERNATIONALTREATY FOR PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES FOR FOOD AND AGRICULTURE, available
at http://www.planttreaty.org/content/bra (lastvisited Feb. 7, 2015); CHE, THE INTERNATIONAL
TREATY FOR PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES FOR FOOD AND AGRICULTURE, available at
http://www.planttreaty.org/content/che (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).

5

6

Edson Beas Rodrigues, Jr., Property Rights, Bicultural Resources and Two Tragedies: Some Lessonsfrom
Brazil, in GENETIC RESOURCES AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 113, 152-53 (Tania Bubela & E.
Richard Gold eds., 2012).
See id. at 153.

7

See id.
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been subject to ITPGR protection. Depending on Brazil's interpretation of the
ITPGR, the protection offered by the national legislation implementing that treaty
would restrict the rights that Novartis had to patent the transferred plant genetic
resources. Had Brazil adopted an interpretation of ITPGR that was too broad, it
would have conflicted with their obligations under TRIPS; however, a narrow
interpretation might not have reserved any of the plant genetic material for food
and agriculture.' In fact, the Brazilian government passed a pre-ITPGR protection
for plant genetic resources in response to this incident.9
This anecdote imparts several lessons: TRIPS and the ITPGR generally
cover the same material but offer different kinds of protection to those dealing in
plant genetic resources. Because of this difference, implementing the ITPGR in
light of the rigid and binding TRIPS agreement can be challenging for nations, but
its implementation can offer critical protection of certain plant genetic materials
used for food production and agriculture. Furthermore, implementing ITPGR is
complicated by the fact that several of its critical phrases are undefined.
The goal of this Comment is to suggest an interpretation of ITPGR's
ambiguous provisions, so that nations that are subject to TRIPS can meaningfully
integrate ITPGR into their national law. The need for such an interpretation has
a degree of immediacy, as less developed countries will come under certain TRIPS
requirements soon. Despite the fact that "TRIPS is now in force
internationally, . . . least developed countries may delay granting patents over
pharmaceuticals until 1 January 2016."'" Pharmaceutical patents often relate to
plant genetic materials, so it is likely that after this requirement goes into effect,
some nations would need to consider how to embody their ITPGR commitment
in national law. This Comment is also meant to address more developed nations
looking to implement the ITPGR in light of TRIPS. For example, Argentina,
Chile, Thailand, and the U.S. are all World Trade Organization (WTO) member
nations that have signed but not ratified the ITPGR." Furthermore, there are also
WTO member nations that have not yet signed the ITPGR, but someday might:

s

It should be noted that ITPGR was not yet in force.

9

See Rodrigues, supranote 5, at 153.
See Tania Bubela & E. Richard Gold, Introducion: Indigenous Rights and Tradiional Knowledge, in

10

GENETIc RESOURCES AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 1, 13 (Tania Bubela & E. Richard Gold

eds., 2012).
11

See Members and Observers, supranote 3; list of Counties,INTERNATIONAL TREATY ON PLANT GENETIC
RESOURCES FOR FOOD AND AGRICULTURE, available at http://www.planttreaty.org/listof-countries (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).
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examples
include Belize, China, Mozambique, New Zealand, Vietnam, and South
2
Africa.

1

The tension between the ITPGR and TRIPS/UPOV points to a
fundamental impasse in international law concerning the property rights of the
genetic materials that make up plants. 3 That is, the intellectual property rights of
plant seed producers and the plant-use rights of traditional farmers are in
conflict. 4 Humans need a diversity of plants for food and agricultural production,
particularly as changing conditions demand that plant seeds change in tandem.'"
The goal of plant genetic diversity can be achieved by encouraging widespread use
and manipulation of seeds to ensure genetic permutations. This makes for a robust
and biodiverse planet. The process of creating genetic permutations can be done
naturally or through modern genetic engineering.
Section II of this Comment explores these processes by providing
background information on biotechnology and giving a brief overview of
intellectual property rights, laying the foundation for a more comprehensive
examination of the relevant treaties. Section III details the main provisions of the
ITPGR, UPOV, and TRIPS, as well as their ambiguities. Section IV considers the
ways that nations implement the treaties, examining the ITPGR, UPOV, and
TRIPS as overlapping legal regimes to suggest how a nation can best implement
ITPGR given the requirements of TRIPS. Section V discusses how to interpret
the treaties in light of one another and recommends an interpretation of ITPGR
that allows it to do work in light of UPOV and TRIPS.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Biotechnology
The differences between the treaties to be discussed are fundamentally about
the use of biotechnology. Biotechnology is the manipulation of biological items
or processes through the use of technology. 6 More specifically for the purposes
of this Comment, the subset of biotechnology known as genetic engineering
allows researchers to insert genes from one type of organism into another
12

Id.

13

See generaly Rodrigues, sipra note 5.

14

See id.

15

See Biodiversity, FOOD

16

AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, available at
http://www.fao.org/biodiversity/en/.
See Barbara A. Schaal, Biodiversi ,, Biotechnologv and the Environment, in BIODIVERSITY AND THE LAW:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, BIOTF.CHNOLOGY AND TRADITIONAl. KNOWLEDGE 137, 138 (Charles

McManis ed., 2007).
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organism to create desired characteristics.17 Among other things, it allows them to
engineer seeds. Generally, the goal of biotechnology is to improve on natural
processes and derive outcomes that would be difficult or impossible in nature. 8
Because biotechnology is a relatively new practice in human history that is
evolving quickly, law may have a hard time keeping pace with its developments.
The area of biotechnology most important for this Comment is genetic
engineering of plant genetic resources. Plant genetic resources, at a basic level, are
"the raw material for breeding new plant varieties"; they act as "a reservoir of
genetic diversity."' 9 For example, the genetic make-up of an entire variety of
spinach could be a plant genetic resource. However, plant genetic resources do
not need to comprise a genetic selection that large, which is to say that a plant
genetic resource can be a certain characteristic of a plant instead of the entire
genetic code of that plant."i Researchers, for example, can isolate the gene
sequence that determines the size of the spinach leaf.21 That genetic sequence is
also a plant genetic resource, despite the fact that it does not comprise an entire
plant. Biotechnology allows researchers to manipulate that plant genetic resource
to make larger or smaller spinach leaves.22 They can then insert that plant genetic
resource into a preexisting spinach genetic sequence, and produce spinach seeds
to grow spinach plants with engineered leaf sizes.23 Plant engineers might also be
able to use engineered plant genetic resources across plant types;24 the knowledge
gained from learning how to manipulate the size of spinach leaves might similarly
be used to manipulate the size of cabbages. 2"

18

See 1-2 Biotechnology & Nanotechnology Regulation § 2.01.
See Mark Hannig, An Examination of the Possibilio to Secure Intellectual Propery Rights for Plant Genetic

19

Resources Developed b Indigenous Peoples of the NAFIA States: Domestic Legislation under the International
Conventionfor Protection of New Plant Varieties, 13 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 175, 185 (1996).
K. Hammer & Y. Teklu, Plant Genetic Resources: Selected Issuesfrom Genelic Erosion to GeneticEngineering,

17

109 J. AGRIC. & RURAL DEv. IN THE TROPICS AND SUBTROPICS 15, 16 (2008). Note that the
Convention on Biological Diversity defines genetic resources as "genetic material of actual or

potential value."

WILLIAM LESSER, SUSTAINABLE USE OF GENETIC RESOURCES UNDER THE
CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY: EXPLORING ACCESS AND BENEFIT SHARING ISSUES 5
20

(1997).
See LESSER, supra note 19, at 5.

21

See Hannig, supra note 18, at 186.

22

See Schaal, supra note 16, at 138.

23

For a more general discussion of biotechnological processes, see id.

24

See id at 138.

25

See id.
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Plant genetic engineering seeks to replicate traditional practices.2" A
fundamental principle of genetics is that there are characteristic variations among
individuals, and that some of those variations will better help individuals survive.2"
For example, some humans have longer legs than others as a result of genetic
differences. For some populations, this characteristic was more likely to help an
individual survive because he or she could run faster and avoid being eaten by
certain predators. The individuals in those populations with shorter legs were
more likely to be eaten, and therefore not reproduce, leaving the longer legged
individuals to pass on their genes for longer legs to their children. In other
populations of humans, perhaps shorter, stronger legs were more advantageous
for survival because, for example, they equip a person with better climbing
abilities. These variations have resulted in a modern heterogeneous population
with a mix of both long and short legs.28 Genetic variability and inheritability are
the two primary tools of genetic change over time.29
The same principles hold true for plants. Fuji apple trees in Washington will
generally be more reproductively successful if they bloom early, as it doesn't often
snow in Washington, and an early-blooming tree will produce more robust fruit
and seeds for dissemination. In contrast, a Fuji apple tree in snowy Michigan is
more likely to successfully pass on its genetic material if it is late-blooming, as
freezing temperatures decimate apple populations. Different conditions naturally
ensure genetic diversity among plant genetic resources. Enter humans, who began
manipulating agriculture around 13,000 years ago.30 Through the process of
genetic variation and heritability, humans increased the diversity of the plant
genetic resource pool by moving plants to new habitats. As agriculture became
slightly more sophisticated, farmers began splicing seeds in a primitive (and
successful) attempt to create new plant hybrids. 31 They also began selectively
"breeding" seeds to express desirable traits. 32 Biotechnology mimics these
3
processes and makes them more efficient.

26

See Hannig, supra note 18, at 185.

27

See Ryan M.T. Iwasaka, Note, Chakrabarqy to Chimeras: The Growing Need for Evolutionary Biologv in

29

Patent Law, 109 YALE L.J. 1505, 1508-09 (2000).
See David E. Adelman, Sdentific Activism and Restraint: The Inteplay of Statistics,Judgment, and Procedure
in Environmental Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 497, 512 (2004).
See Bailey Kuklin, Evolution, Politics and Law, 38 VAL U. L. REV. 1129, 1135 (2004).

30

SeeJared Diamond, Evolution, Consequencesand Future of PlantandAnimal Domestication, NATURE (Aug.

31

8, 2002), available at http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v418/n6898/full/nature0l019.html.
See Biotechnology & Nanotechnology Regulation, supra note 17, § 2.01.

32

See Hannig, supranote 18, at 185.

33

See id. at 186.

28
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B. Intellectual Property Protections
Intellectual property protections are enforced pursuant to national law and,
therefore, differ across nations.34 Intellectual property protections concerning

plants are a particular challenge for inventors because plants' ability to selfreproduce makes plant-related inventions harder to control.3" Several varieties of
intellectual property protection exist.36 Perhaps the most well known and broadly
used-and also the most applicable to genetic resources-is patent protection.37
Any examination of general intellectual property protection regimes are far outside
of the scope of this Comment. 8 However, a primer on intellectual property,
particularly patent protections, in the context of plant genetic resources is relevant
to understanding the international tension over best practices for food and
agriculture.
Patent protection applies to plant genetic material. 9 International patent
protection does not exist,4' which weakens the protections available to plant
producers as seeds are easily transported and used across borders. The World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), an agency of the UN, helps solve this
problem by setting international policy for intellectual property rights and
providing a forum for international intellectual property (IP) dispute settlements.41
Although there are various types of patents, this Comment will only address
the specific requirements for utility patents, because they are most relevant to
34

See Mary E. Footer, A Tale of Two Commons: Plant Genetic Resources and Agricultural Trade Reform, in
THE REGULATORY CHAI.LENGE OF BIOTECHNOI.OGY: HUMAN GENETICS, FOOD AND PATENTS
174, 191 (Han Somsen ed., 2007); Geoff Tansey, Farming, Food and Global Rules, in THE FUTURE
CONTROL OF FOOD: A GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS AND RULES ON INTELLECTUAl.
PROPERTY, BIODIVERSlTY AND FOOD SECURITY 3,13 (Geoff Tansey & Tasmin Rajotte eds., 2008).

35

See David R. Nicholson,AgriculturalBiotechnolograndGenetically-ModifiedFoods: Will the Developing World
Bite?, 8 VA.J.L. & TECH., Summer 2003, at 1, 7 (2003).
See Tansey, supra note 34, at 12.

36

37
38
39

40

41

Id. at 17.
See generally id.
Plant patents were first introduced in the U.S. in 1930 with the passage of the Plant Patent Act, 35
U.S.C. § 161. See A. Bryan Endres & Carly E. Giffin, Necessity Is the Mother, but ProtectionMay Not Be
the Father of Invention: The Limited Effect of Intellectual Property Regimes on Agricultural Innovation, 14
COwUM. So. & TECH. L. REv. 203, 206 (2012).
Anne E. Crocker, Will PlantsFinaly Grow into FullPatent Protectionon an InternationalLevel? A Look at
the History of U.S. and InternationalPatentLaw Regarding Patent Protectionfor Plants and the likely Changes
after the U.S. Supreme Court's Decision inJ.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred, 8 DRAKEJ. AGRIC. L.
251, 253 (2003). Note that TRIPS is the closest thing to an international system of intellectual
property protection.
See Inside WIPO, THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, available at
http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2015).
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plant genetic resources.42 Utility patents are available in the U.S. to anyone who
"discovered or invented any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter."4 Inventors, using a utility patent, can patent the entire
plant or individual components (such as genes, methods of breeding, DNA
strands, or tissue samples), as long as the patented material meets the criteria for
a utility patent.' In the U.S., there are four requirements for a utility patent, and
they are set forth in § 101 of the U.S. Patent Act. Those four requirements are:
the material must be (1) statutory, 4 (2) new, (3) useful, and (4) nonobvious. 46 Most
developed countries' patent systems track these requirements. In Europe there are
generally three recognized requirements for a patent.47 The invention must be (1)
novel, (2) have an industrial application, and (3) involve an inventive step.48
Plant producers can also use trade secret law as a separate intellectual
property regime to protect their plant variety rights. 49 Trade secret law protects
certain qualifying intellectual property from infringement-so long as the 1P
remains a secret. 5 Trade secret law was effective at protecting plant hybrids, which
had improvements that could not be easily replicated.5 1 However, as
biotechnology became more prevalent and it became easier for competitors to
reverse engineer plant hybrids, the biotech industry turned to utility patents
instead of trade secret law as the preferred form of protecting plant variety rights.52

43

This statement applies specifically to the U.S. As mentioned, there is no international system of IP
protection, so each nation will have slightly different requirements and terminology for patent
protection. While this comment covers the requirements for a U.S.-specific utility patent, many
other countries will have similar requirements.
Patent Act ofJuly 4, 1836, ch. 357, 5 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119 (1836).

44

See Nicholson, supranote 35, at 7.

45

§ 101 of the U.S. Patent Act only permits patents on certain types of inventions. The limited
categories are a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. This requirement is
commonly called the statutory requirement. See, for example, Patent Requirements, BITLAW.COM,
http://www.bidaw.com/patent/requirements.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2015).

42

46

jypes

of

Patents,

U.S.

PATENT

OFFICE,

http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/

oeip/taf/patdesc.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2015). For an explanation of the requirements, see General
Information Concerning Patents, U.S. PATENT OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/patents-gettingstarted/general-information-concerning-patents#heading-4.
47

See Tansey, supra note 34, at 17.

48

Id.

49
50

Note that many nations do not provide trade secret law as a legal remedy. The U.S. is the only
significant exception.
See Robert G. Bone, The (Still)Shaky Foundations of Trade Secret Law, 92 TEx. L. Riw. 1803, 1805

51

(2014).
See Tansey, supra note 34, at 20.

52

See Nicholson, supra note 35, at 7.
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Instead, utility patents became the most popular form of protection for plant
variety rights because inventors think that they provide the most comprehensive
protection for plant varieties. 3
III. TREATIES
Many international IP protection regimes implicate seeds and plant genetic
resources. Some of the current treaties and organizations that affect IP rights and
relate to plant genetic material include the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD), the
World Trade Organization (WTO), the ongoing implementation of the
Agreement on TRIPS, the network of international agricultural research centers
(IARCs), seed conservation banks administered by the Consultative Group on
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), and several treaties administered by
the United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization (UNFAO).5 a The
UNFAO established the ITPGR.
A. International Treaty for Plant Genetic Resources for Food
and Agriculture (ITPGR)
1. Formation.
The ITPGR is the primary international treaty protecting the agricultural
biodiversity necessary for long-term human food consumption."s The treaty was
adopted in 2001 and entered into force in 2004.56 The stated purposes of the treaty
are the "conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic resources for food and
agriculture," as well as the "fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out
of their use, in harmony with the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), for
sustainable agriculture and food security."5" The ITPGR was informed by failed
efforts to protect biodiversity under other agreements. Specifically, it was passed
in the wake of a non-binding 1983 International Understanding on Plant Genetic

53

See id.

54

Keith Aoki & Kennedy Luvai, The InternationalProperty Regime Complex: Reclaiming 'Common Heritage'
Treatment in the InternationalPlant Genetic Resources Regime Complex, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 35, 39
(2007).

55

For a brief history of the failed and partial agreements that resulted in the formation of the ITPGR,
see Ronan Kennedy, International Conflicts over Plant Genetic Resources: Future Developments, 20 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 1, 25-26 (2006).
See Christine Gerstetter et al., The InternationalTreay on Plant Genetic Resourcesfor Food andAgriculture
within the Current Legal Regime Complex on Plant Genetic Resources, 10 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 259, 259
(2007).

56

57

See ITPGR, supra note 1, art. 1.1.
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Resources (IUPGR), which had the same fundamental goals that the ITPGR later
adopted. 8 The earlier agreement largely failed because it was non-binding and
lacked support from key countries, including the U.S.59 Notably, the U.S. is only
a signatory to the ITPGR, not a contracting party.6" Even that relatively low level
of U.S. support seems to be enough to make the ITPGR more successful than its
predecessor, the Convention on Biological Diversity, to which the U.S. was not a
61
party.
The ITPGR was passed to pursue some of the goals of the non-binding but
influential CBD. 62 The CBD remains persuasive in the international legal arena as63
guidance on what plant genetic resources should be protected internationally.
The CBD was a "complete, if complex, framework treaty. '' 64 There is still much
dispute about the best methods to implement the ideals from the CBD.65
Like the CBD and the IUPGR, the ITPGR is non-binding on non-member
nations. 66 The ITPGR takes a global commons approach to plant genetic
resources, in contrast to the CBD's failed national sovereignty approach. 6' A
global commons approach treats plant genetic resources as international property,
regardless of where they are located. 68 The theory is that all nations need and
benefit from a diversity of genetic resources, and so plant genetic resources are a
common good.69 The oceans are an example of a global commons: they are
recognized as a common good that all nations have an interest in and which no
nation owns. 0 In contrast, the national sovereignty approach treats plant genetic
58

See Aoki & Luvai, supra note 54, at 52 (outlining the history of the ITPGR).

59 See id.
at 42.
See List of Countries, supra note 11.

60

61

See Kennedy, supra note 55, at 21-22, 25-29.

62

See ITPGR, supra note 1.

63

See general# LESSER, supra note 19.

64

See id.
at 3.

65

See LESSER, supra note 19, at 11.

66

See INTERNATIONAL LAW RELEVANCE TO PLANT GENETIC RFSOURCES: A PRACTICAL. REVIEW FOR
SCIENTISTS AND OTHER PROFESSIONALS WORKING WITH PLANT GENE.TIC RESOURCES 7 (Susan

Bragdon ed., 2004).
67

68
69
70

See Charles R. McManis & Eul Soo Seo, The Interace of Open Source and Proprietay Agricultural
Innovation: FacilitatedAccessand Benefit-Sharing underthe New .FAOTrea, 30 WASH. U.J. L. POL'Y 405,
430 (2009).
C.E. Karunakaran, Climate Change Response: Equio or Nothing, in PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF
ENVIRONMENT POLICY: INDIAN PERSPECTIVE 155, 160 (M. S. Bhatt et al. eds., 2008).
See LESSER, supra note 19, at 14.
Note, oceans are relatively unique among common goods because they allow nations to have a
limited amount of sovereign control over certain parts of the common good. See CYRILLE DE

Summer 2015

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

resources found in a nation as the sovereign property of that nation.71
Analogously, this is the approach that the international community has taken to
land ownership-a single nation owns a piece of land and may reap all of its
benefits.
2. Main provisions.
For this Comment's purposes, the four most relevant provisions of the
ITPGR are Article 9, Article 11, Article 12, and Article 13. Article 9 effectuates
one of the two primary purposes of the ITPGR: the protection of farmers' rights.
Specifically, Article 9 recognizes a farmer's right to "save, use, exchange and sell"
72
seeds, but it leaves the implementation of these rights up to national legislation.
This is an important provision for achieving the other primary goal of the treatydiverse plant genetic resources-because traditional farming practices help
promote local biodiversity as farmers trade seeds locally and breed new varieties
73
of plants over time.
Furthermore, traditional farming practices are important for using plant
genetic resources for their intended purpose (food and agriculture); farmers, after
all, actually produce food. However, those traditional farming practices are often
at odds with intellectual property protections for plant genetic materials.74 Recall
that ITPGR is not self-executing. Nevertheless, Article 9 is explicitly dependent
on national laws for implementation.75 Despite Article 9's inability to compel
contracting nations to adopt protections for farmers' rights, it is still an important
provision because it calls for nations to grant the right for farmers to be part of
the discussions and decision-making processes that affect their rights.
Article 10 of ITPGR creates a Multilateral System (MLS) for plant genetic
resource sharing founded on a national sovereignty approach.7 6 The MLS is
distinct from the public domain, as the plant genetic resources in the MLS can
only be used for "the purpose of utilization and conservation for research,
KLEMM & CLARE SHINE, BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY CONSERVATION AND THE LAW: LEGAL
MECHANISMS FOR CONSERVING SPECIES AND ECOSYSTEMS 1 (1993).
71

LE1SSER, supra note 19, at 13.

72

See ITPGR, supra note 1, art. 9.

73

See Rebecca Crookshanks & Peter W.B. Phillips, A ComparativeAnalysis ofAccess and Benefits-Sharing
Sjystems, in GENETIC RESOURCES AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 63, 69 (Tania Bubela & E.
Richard Gold eds., 2012).

74

Much of the intellectual property system is set up with the intention of protecting plant genetic
resources used for pharmaceutical development instead of protecting plant genetic resources used
for food.

75

See ITPGR, supra note 1, art. 9.
See id., art. 10.

76
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breeding and training for food and agriculture, provided that such purpose does
not include
chemical, pharmaceutical and/or other non-food/feed industrial
7
uses."

7

While Article 10 creates the MLS, Article 11 details its coverage. 78 In
particular, it establishes that the MLS covers "all plant genetic resources for food
and agriculture listed in Annex I that are under the management and control of
the Contracting Parties and in the public domain., 7 9 It protects sixty-four of the
most used crops in the world, which account for 80% of all agricultural goods
used internationally.8" In addition, it sets out a plan for sustainable use of the
world's four most cultivated crops: maize, potatoes, wheat, and rice. 8' It also
requires Contracting States to encourage private parties within their jurisdiction
to contribute to the MLS if they hold plant genetic resources covered by the
treaty.8" Those private parties are not required to contribute, as only nations can
be parties to the ITPGR.8 3
Article 12 details how parties can access the MLS.84 It grants access to the
international collection of plant genetic resources to nations for genetic research
and plant breeding. 8 Article 12.3 works in conjunction with Article 10 to grant
access to the MLS for breeding and research, explicitly restricting access to MiLS
materials for the purpose of pharmaceutical developments.8 6 Of particular
importance is Article 12.3(d), which prohibits recipients of MLS material from
"claim[ing] any intellectual property or other rights that limit the facilitated access
to the plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, or their genetic parts or
87
components, in the form received from the Multilateral System.

77

Michael Halewood & Kent Nnadozie, Giving Prioriy to the Commons: The InternationalTreaty on Plant
Genetic Resourcesfor Food andAgriculture, in THE FUTURE CONTROl OF FOOD, stora note 34, at 115,
126-27; see ITPGR, siupra note 1, art. 12.

78

See ITPGR, snpra note 1, art. 11.

79
80

Id., art. 11.2.
Id., Annex I; Overview, INTERNATIONAL TREATY ON PLANT GLNETIC RESOURCES FOR FOOD AND

81

AGRICIJI.TURE, http://www.planttreaty.org/content/overview (last visited Jan. 27, 2014).
See Overview, id.

82

See ITPGR, supra note 1, art. 11.3.

83

See Halewood & Nnadozie, sapranote 77, at 127.

84

See ITPGR, supra note 1, art. 12.

85

Id., art. 12.3(a).

86

Id., art. 12.3.

87

Id., art. 12.3(d).
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Article 13 establishes a benefit-sharing procedure under the MLS. 88 The idea
of the benefit sharing system is that those parties benefitting monetarily from
MLS-derived materials are to make a payment into a joint fund so that all
contracting parties can share the benefits.89 The treaty gives the Governing Body
of the treaty significant discretion to adjust how much payment is appropriate.9"
Benefit sharing encourages innovation and monetization of plant genetic
materials. However, in order for the benefits of innovation and monetization to
occur, individual nations must contribute to the MLS. Article 13 also specifies that
nations should share the benefits of the MLS through the exchange of
91
information, technology transfers, and capacity building.
3. Ambiguities in treaty provisions.
Part of the difficulty states face in implementing ITPGR in light of
intellectual property treaties derives from ambiguities in certain ITPGR
provisions. Primarily, there are three ambiguous provisions written such that the
international community does not know how to interpret them. 92 The
interpretation of these provisions will determine a treaty's effect once integrated
into a nation's domestic law. This section will only describe the ambiguities in the
treaty provisions; later sections will discuss how those ambiguities should be
interpreted.
The first ambiguity relates to how broadly one should interpret the reach of
the MLS. Under Article 11.2, only those plant genetic resources "that are 'under
the management and control of the Contracting Parties and in the public domain'
fall within the Multilateral System." 93 This part of the treaty seems to be in tension
with "the prohibition in Article 12.3(d) against claiming any intellectual property
or other rights that limit facilitated access to [plant genetic resources], 'or their
genetic parts or components, in the form received from the Multilateral
System."' 94 This tension arises because the plant genetic resources in
Article 12.3(d) "would not, in any event, be entitled to intellectual property
protection because they are by definition in the public domain."9 McManis and

88

See id., art. 13.

89

See id., art. 13.2(d)(ii).

90

See id., art. 13.2(d).

91

See id., art. 13.

92

Seegeneral McManis & Seo, supra note 67; Gerstetter et al., supra note 56.

93

McManis & Seo, supra note 67, at 452 (citing ITPGR, supra note 1, art. 11.2).

94

Id

95

Id.
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Seo argue that this tension indicates that Article 12.3(d) is not doing much work
in the ITPGR.96
The second ambiguity in the ITPGR relates to this same section of the treaty.
Prominent authors have questioned the definition of two key phrases in the
prohibition against claiming property rights over plant genetic materials.
Article 12.3(d) contains the ambiguous requirement "that recipients of PGRFA
shall not claim any IPR or other rights that limit the facilitated access to that
PGRFA or their genetic parts or components in the form received from the
Multilateral System." " Specifically, the phrases "genetic parts or components"
and "in the form received" are undefined.9 8 As these two phrases are significant
in controlling what intellectual property can be claimed, a consistent definition is
key to understanding the interaction between ITPGR and intellectual property
regimes."
Third, there is an ambiguity related to the benefit-sharing provision of the
ITPGR. Article 13.2 covers benefit sharing under the MLS. Article 13.2(d)(ii)
indicates that the MLS access agreement between nations
shall include a clause that a recipient who commercializes a product that
incorporates material accessed from the Multilateral System and who restricts
the availability of that product for further research and breeding has to pay
an equitable share of the benefits from commercialization into the financial
mechanism referred to in Article 19.3(o.10

This provision is meant to make parties that access materials from the MLS
pay a fee to a group fund if they commercialize the derivatives of those products.
This requirement has three ambiguities: (1) "the treaty does not specify what
activities 'restrict the availability' of a product"; (2) "it does not make clear what
constitutes 'commercialization"'; and (3) "it does not clarify the meaning of the
term 'incorporates.""" By leaving these terms undefined, the scope of the ITPGR
is critically unclear. It should be noted that later revisions to the ITPGR's
supporting documents provided some clarity on the logistics related to these
questions.102 Specifically, the 1TPGR delegated the determination of the form and
96

See id.

97

Gerstetter et al., supranote 56, at 264.

98

See id.

This section of the ITPGR, supra note 1, was left ambiguous by design as the result of a negotiated
agreement by the contracting parties. Nations disagreed about allowing intellectual property rights
to be claimed from genes derived from MLS materials, and so they compromised by drafting
ambiguous language. See Halewood & Nnadozie, supra note 77, at 129.
100 Gerstetter et al., supranote 56, at 264.

99

101 Id. at 264-65.
102

See id. at 265.
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amount of payment required under Article 13.2 to the governing body; °3
however, the question of what the required payments to the group fund should
be used for is still an open one.
4. Interpretation language.
Treaties generally contain language establishing their relationship to other
treaties, and the ITPGR contains language about how it is to be interpreted.'
First, its preamble states that it should be considered "mutually supportive" of
other treaties.' This implies that it is meant to work with other treaties rather
than invalidate them. Furthermore, the preamble goes on to state that the treaty
is not meant to change legal rights or obligations of the contracting parties under
other international agreements.0 6 What is more, the preamble claims not to create
a hierarchy between the ITPGR and other treaties."07 Because it was drafted as a
compromise, the language of these two provisions is contradictory.0 8 This
interpretive language interacts with international norms about how to interpret
treaties, which will be explored more thoroughly below.
B. International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of
Plants (UPOV)
1. Formation.
UPOV is the older of the two intellectual property rights treaties to be
discussed. UPOV, unlike TRIPS, is specific to plant genetic resources. 9 UPOV
began in 1961 as an organization of nations to protect the rights of plant
breeders, "0 which were already framed in opposition to the rights of farmers.'
The current version of the agreement was implemented in 1991.112 There are fifty-

105

See id.
Neither UPOV nor TRIPS contains language about interpretation relative to other treaties. See id.
at 261-62.
See lTPGR, supranote 1; see also, Gerstetter et al., supra note 56, at 262.

106

See Gerstetter et al., supra note 56 at 262.

107

See id.

108

See id. (citing Gerald K. Moore & Witold Tymowski, Explanatory Guide to the International Treaty
on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (IUCN 2005)).
See Graham Dutfield, Turning Plant Varielies into Intellectual Propery: The UPO V Convention, in TH
FUTURE CONTROL OF FOOD, supra note 34, at 27,36.
See id. at 32-37.

103
104

100

110
Ill
112

See Aoki & Luvai, supranote 54, at 43.
See Dutfield, supranote 109, at 35.
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four member nations to UPOV; forty-three of those nations are parties to the
1991 version of the treaty,' 13 including the U.S." 4
Functionally, UPOV is meant to provide intellectual property protections
for plant genetic materials to benefit plant producers." 5 It protects all varieties of
plants as long as they are new, distinct, uniform, and stable. 1 6 "Plant variety"
under UPOV means any grouping of plant type which can be defined by an
expression of a physical characteristic that makes it distinguishable from other
plant groups and which can be reproduced while retaining that defining
characteristic." 7 There is no enforcement mechanism in the 1991 UPOV treaty;
instead, it is dependent on member nations to implement the provisions via
national legislation."' Proponents of UPOV claim that, despite prioritizing plant
breeders, the convention has helped farmers, growers, and breeders alike gain
access to better varieties of plants, thereby helping them grow better crops." 9
2. Main Provisions.
UPOV specifies the plant genetic material that each country must protect,
but it does not specify how each country is to do so, leaving that to national
legislation. 12 Thus, plant producers can have uniform expectations about which
plant genetic rights will be protected in UPOV countries, but they will have to go
through each nation's IP protection process individually. UPOV stipulates that
each member country must provide intellectual property protection with national
legislation for at least twenty-four species of plants within eight years of signing
the treaty.1 21 In 1991, this requirement expanded to include "requiring that all
member countries apply the convention to all genera and species [and] by
extending the exclusive rights to include harvested material ([for example,] fruit,
113

See McManis & Seo, supra note 67, at 425.

114 UPOV Notification Number 69, INTERNATIONAL UNION FOR THE PROTECTION OF NEW VARIETIES

OF PLANTS, available at http://www.upov.int/upovlex/en/text-notification.jsp?id=69

(last visited

Jan. 27, 2015).
115 See Dutfield, supra note 109, at 33.
116

See id.
at 35.

117 See id.
at 37.
118 See McManis & Seo, supra note 67, at 425.
119 See UPOV Report on theImpact of Plant Varieoy Protection,
INTERNATIONAL UNION FOR THE
PROTECTION OF NEW VARIETIES OF PLANTS (2005), available
at http://www.upov.int/export/sites/

120

upov/about/en/pdf/353_upovreport.pdf.
See Dutfield, supra note 109, at 45.

121 Intellectual Propery Rights for Biotechnologv, in GLOBAl. BIODIVERSITY: STATUS OF THE EARTH'S LIVING
RISOURCES 495, 496 (Brian Groombridge ed., 1992), available at http://www.ciesin.org/docs/008265/008-265i.html.
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wheat grown for milling into flour)."' 2 2 This more expansive provision gives the
owners of plant genetic resources greater control over those rights, including the
for-consumption end product.'2 3
The 1991 UPOV agreement witnessed the erosion of a 1978 protection that
allowed farmers to purchase protected seeds and reuse them without paying a
royalty.' In the 1991 treaty, it was up to national law to provide an exception for
farmers to save and reuse seeds. 2 ' UPOV 1978 was reasonably permissible:
"Article 14 of UPOV 1991, in turn, requires authorization by the breeder, inter
alia, for producing, selling and exporting the propagating material of a protected
variety."' 26 Farmers cannot trade seeds with other farmers, as is traditional practice
in many places, under the 1991 provision. 12 7 These changes indicate a normative
shift away from protecting farmers' rights.
C. Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS)
1. Formation.
Remedying some of UPOV's failures, TRIPS came into force in response to
dissatisfaction among developed nations with many developing nations' failure to
respect intellectual property rights regimes.12 8 TRIPS was adopted in 1994 and
became effective in 1995.129 There are several major differences between UPOV
and TRIPS. TRIPS recognized certain implementation failures of UPOV and
other international IP agreements, and it created a comprehensive, self-executing
agreement regarding intellectual property rights. 3 Second, whereas UPOV
created a patent-like system, TRIPS dealt with patents and other established
intellectual property rights regimes.' 3

122

Id

123

See id.

124

See Aoki & Luvai, supra note 54, at 45.

121

See id.at 45.

126

Gerstetter et. al., supra note 56, at 269.

127

See Lauren Winter, Note, Cultivating Farmers' Rights: Reconciling Food Securiy, Indigenous Agriculture, and

128

TIRIPS, 43 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 223, 232 (2010).
See Pedro Roffe, Bringing Minimum Global Intellectual Property Standards into Agiculture: The Agreement on

Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (I RIPS), in THE FUTURE CONTROL OF FOOD, supra
note 34, at 48, 49.
129 See Aoki & Luvai, supra note 54, at 51.
130

See Roffe, supra note 128, at 52.

131 See id. at 52.

Vol. 16 No. 1

Plant Genelic Resources

2. Main provisions.
TRIPS provides more effective protection for intellectual property rights
than previous IP treaties because it is self-executing and has "teeth.' 3 2 That is,
there are provisions in TRIPS to compel member nations' compliance with the
treaty provisions."' Specifically, TRIPS is a treaty among World Trade
Organization members.' TRIPS, unlike many treaties, can be self-executing
because it is linked to WTO's "hard-edged dispute settlement system whereby
treaty bargains are enforced through mandatory adjudication backed up the by
threat of retaliatory sanctions."' 131 Many developing .nations did not want an
international IP rights treaty for plant genetic resources, so that it would be easier
to access seeds for food production. The nations were forced to accept TRIPS if
they wanted to retain WTO membership, which provides tremendous economic
benefits. 136
Functionally, TRIPS is more expansive and more rigid than UPOV. 137
Because the WTO is primarily focused on trade, TRIPS provides more access to
free markets in exchange for protecting the IP rights of other nations.' 3 8
Furthermore, TRIPS covers a broad array of subject material: "although
Article 27.3(b) allows the patentability exclusion for plants and animals other than
microorganisms, it obliges member countries to provide either patent or effective
1 39
sui generis protection, or any combination of the two, to protect plant varieties."
Despite this, "nothing in TRIPS requires sharing of financial or technological
benefits of biodiversity-related patents and plant innovations with source
countries or communities."' 40 Note the stark contrast to ITPGR's requirement to
share financial and technological benefits.

132

See id.

133

See id.

134
135

See id.
Aoki & Luvai, supranote 54, at 56.

136

See Winter, supra note 127, at 233.

137

See id. at 225.

138

See Laurence R. Heifer, Regime Shifting: The 7 RIPsAgreement andNew Dynamics ofInternationalIntellectual
Propery Lawmaking, 29 YA1.1 J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (2004).

139

McManis & Seo, supra note 67, at 428.

140

Heifer, supra note 138, at 30.
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IV. THE CHALLENGES OF IMPLEMENTING THE TREATIES

A. Treaty Interpretation Generally
The relationship between ITPGR, UPOV, and TRIPS is a matter of treaty
interpretation. This section will examine the canons of treaty interpretation,
whereas the next section will address how to interpret 1TPGR and UPOV/TRIPS
in light of each other and these canons.
There are competing theories about how overlapping international treaties
should be interpreted.' 4 One of the most fundamental canons of interpretation is
to prefer any treaty interpretation that avoids conflict with other treaties.'42 This
method would dictate that "[o]f several possible interpretations of a certain treaty
norm, the one that does not lead to a collision with the norm of the second treaty
is to be preferred."' 43 This method, however, does not necessarily guarantee that
the treaties are interpreted as intended, or even in the best way for achieving their
international goals. Instead, interpretation premised on avoidance manipulates
words to avoid challenging legal questions. Further, this interpretation does not
take into account that some treaties take precedence over other treaties.
The Vienna Convention attempted to codify customary international law on
how treaties should be interpreted to provide a consistent set of guidelines for
implementing nations.'" It is the closest thing that international law has to a treaty
interpretation guide. 4 ' The Vienna Convention was drafted by the UN and

entered into force in 1980.146 The Convention is itself a treaty and therefore binds
the nations that have signed and ratified it.'47 The rules laid out in the Vienna
Convention are treated as customary international law and widely followed, even
by nations that have not ratified the Convention, such as the U.S.' 48 Furthermore,
the Vienna Convention has "been used in (almost) every international

141 Seegeneraly ChristopherJ. Borgen, Resolving Trea*y Conflicts, 37 GEO. WASH. JNT'LL. REV. 573 (2005).
142

See Gerstetter et. al., supra note 56, at 260.

143

Id. at 260 (citing Harald Hohmann, Der Konflikt 7wischenfreiem Handelund Umweltschut Z in WITO und

EG [1he Conflict between Free Trade and Environmental Protection in the VTO and EC], 46 RECHT

DER

INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAi--T [RIW] 88 (2000) (Ger.)).
144

See Evan Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty Interpretation,44 VA. J.
INT'L. L. 431, 433 (2004); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 18. 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.

145

See Borgen supra note 141, at 576-77.

146

See Criddle, sipra note 144, at 433-34.

147

See id. at 434.

148

See id.
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jurisdiction."' 49 Because of the uncontested preeminence of the Vienna
Convention, this Comment relies on it to interpret ITPGR, UPOV, and TRIPS.
The Vienna Convention requires consideration of how treaties come into
force, that is, how they become international agreements. Signatories of treaties
are merely required to "refrain from acts which would defeat the object and
purpose of [the] treaty."'5 ° Once a signatory implements domestic legislation to
meet treaty obligations, it becomes a contracting nation. Binding treaty obligations
therefore take precedence over non-binding treaty obligations, because binding
treaties are a legal obligation. This norm is codified in Article 30 of the Vienna
Convention: "When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be
considered as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that
other treaty prevail."'51 Non-binding treaties generally indicate their status as nonbinding by including language similar to this provision.
The Vienna Convention also prescribes how to interpret treaties that might
conflict. When two treaties conflict or might conflict, typical Vienna Convention
interpretation means that the latter treaty takes precedence over the earlier treaty,
if it was entered into by the same parties.' 52 This would mean that ITPGR as the
latter treaty would take precedence over both UPOV and TRIPS. However, this
guideline only applies if there is no language in either of the treaties to indicate
which treaty is inferior and which is superior.' 53 Notice the two important caveats
to this rule: the treaties must be made by the same parties, and there must not be
interpretation language in the treaties. ITPGR and UPOV/TRIPS do not meet
either caveat, and consequently that Vienna Convention principle is not useful for
interpreting the treaties described above.
The Vienna Convention imposes another condition on treaty interpretation:
a good faith requirement that a treaty should be interpreted "in accordance with
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in
the light of its object and purpose."' 54 This general obligation indicates that treaties
are not bare written agreements, but instead complex documents that should not
be manipulated until they have lost all ordinary meaning. In other words, a nation
should not implement treaty obligations if doing so would require the nation to
strip all meaning out of the treaty.

149 TREATIES AND SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE 14 (Georg Nolte ed., 2013).

150

Vienna Convention, supra note 144, art. 18.

151 Id., art. 30.2.

152 See Gerstetter et. al., supra note 56, at 261.
153

Id.at 262-63.

154

Vienna Convention, supra note 144, art. 31.1.
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Section V will look at how the different treaties bearing on plant genetic
resources can be implemented and interpreted together. Where necessary, it will
suggest an interpretation of an ambiguous ITPGR provision that accords with and
relies on language within the controlling treaties. However, conflicts can arise
when one treaty allows what another forbids."' 5 In the context of ITPGR
tensions were created by TRIPS's more stringent compliance mechanisms as
compared to those of treaty systems outside of the WTO. This created an
imbalance whereby compliance with the principles, norms, and rules of
another regime could be subordinated
to compliance with TRIPS in areas
56
where the two regimes overlapped.1
Enforcement mechanisms for the treaties are just as important for
determining how the treaties interact as the substantive text of the treaties
themselves.
B. The Interaction between ITPGR, UPOV, and TRIPS
The different content of ITPGR and UPOV/TRIPS seems to generate intertreaty conflict. The UNFAO indicates that ITPGR is legally binding on member
nations."' All WTO member nations are legally obligated to fulfill their treaty
obligations under TRIPS. As described in Section III, TRIPS is the only of the
three treaties at issue that has a built-in enforcement mechanism. TRIPS contains
penalties and uses the WTO's internal mechanism of sanctions to force nations
to comply with its provisions. However, signatories of UPOV and ITPGR are not
legally obligated to pass domestic implementing legislation to fulfill their treaty
obligations under those agreements, as these treaties are not self-enforcing. Once
nations do pass such legislation, they will be considered a contracting party, rather
than just a signatory of the treaty. Furthermore, because ITPGR contains
significantly vague language, member nations can pass domestic implementing
legislation that doesn't conflict with TRIPS, but which doesn't really meet any of
the intended obligations of ITPGR. The obligations of UPOV and TRIPS are
similar enough that they can generally be implemented by the same nation without
conflict.5 8 However, the substantive provisions of ITPGR and UPOV/TRIPS
seemingly are in contradiction and cannot be implemented together so easily. But,

155

See Gerstetter et al., supra note 56, at 260.

156

Heifer, supranote 138, at 27.
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Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, U.N. FOOD

AND

AGRICULTURE

ORGANIZATION, available at http://www.fao.org/Ag/cgrfa/itpgr.htm (last visited Jun. 25, 2015).
158

In fact, Free Trade Agreements, which are at the heart of TRIPS, often include provisions requiring
that both nations must implement UPOV. See Tasmin Rajotte, The Negotiations Web: Complex
Connections,in THE FUTURE CONTROL OF FOOD, supra note 34, at 141, 142.
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as a practical matter, ITPGR and TRIPS do not conflict under international law
because nations that are parties to both treaties are only obligated under one
treaty-TRIPS. The role of ITPGR in some nations, then, is to be implemented
in light of TRIPS in a way that avoids conflicting with TRIPS but still
accomplishes ITPGR's goals.
Most scholars in the field argue that there is no inherent conflict between
ITPGR and UPOV/TRIPS. For example, Gerstetter et al. argue that the treaties
are not in conflict if ITPGR creates obligations for individuals rather than
nations."19 The authors go on to argue that even if the ITPGR creates obligations
for nations, the treaties do not conflict: nothing in TRIPS specifically requires any
action that conflicts with ITPGR, but rather, the way some nations have chosen
to implement TRIPS conflicts with ITPGR 60 Some developed nations, finding
TRIPS not to be comprehensive enough, include TRIPS-plus provisions within
free trade agreements.16 1 Often, these agreements will explicitly require nations to
join UPOV. 162 Tasmin Rajotte, the primary developer of intellectual property
rights studies at the Quaker International Affairs Program, points out that the
1TPGR's governing body has not released a statement about the treaty's
interaction with TRIPS. 63 She expects that the interaction between the treaties
will cause more nations to abolish breeder and research exemptions, which she
64
expects will result in the increased use of the ITPGR's benefit sharing provision. 1
Finally, RolfJ6rdens, the Vice Secretary General for UPOV, argues that ITPGR
does not change a country's obligations under UPOV in any way.1 6' He argues
that, as the latter treaty, ITPGR should be interpreted in a way that respects
existing treaties, including UPOV.1 66 J6rdens further claims that the two treaties
pursue different goals and should be administered separately.1 67 However, he
1 68
believes that the goals of the two treaties are reconcilable.
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See Gerstetter et al., supra note 56, at 270-71.
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Id. at 271-72.

161 See Tasmin Rajotte, supra note 158, at 141,142-144.
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Id
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Id. at 153.

164 Id. at 154.

165 See Dora Schaffrin et al., The International Treay on Plant Genetic Resourcesfor Food and AgricultureImplicationsfor Developing Countriesand Interdependencewith InternationalBiodiversiy and IntellectualPropery
Law, 63 (2006), available at http://worldfuturecounci.org/fileadmin/user-upload/Axel/FP
Agriculture/wp5_final-report.pdf.
166 See id.
167

See id.
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See id.
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The text of the treaties supports J6rdens' position that there is not a conflict
between ITPGR and UPOV/TRIPS. The first textual support derives from an
aforementioned ambiguity in Article 13.2(d)(ii) of ITPGR. Gerstetter et al. argue
that ITPGR contemplates profit from intellectual property rights, which is
consistent with an IP regime concerning plant genetic resources.' 69 They support
this argument textually by pointing out that ITPGR contemplates payments to the
collective fund when someone collects monetary benefits from derivatives of
materials accessed through the MLS. 70 Second, Gerstetter et al. argue that plant
breeders are able to fulfill the goals of UPOV-by turning a profit and accessing
plant based rights-even if they have to pay some money to the collective system
for MLS-accessed products. 1 ' Third, Article 15.2 of UPOV provides an optional
exception that allows parties to offer farmers "certain uses of the harvest obtained
'
from a protected variety."172
This flexibility diminishes the significance of a
potential overlap between UPOV and ITPGR by providing countries some
implementing flexibility.
C. Potential Implementation Issues
Although TRIPS/UPOV and ITPGR do not conflict, implementing ITPGR
in the context of TRIPS poses a challenge for nations. This section addresses some
of the specific challenges that nations might face when implementing ITPGR.
The treaties are challenging to implement together because they are pursuing
different goals on the same subject matter. Their respective goals and spirit are
generally contradictory. That is, ITPGR is fundamentally about protecting
farmers' rights, whereas UPOV and TRIPS are fundamentally about protecting
plant developers' rights.173 Farmers' rights and developers' rights are in tension
with each other in practice.174 Pragmatically, farmers can resell seeds in
competition with plant breeders. 7 ' Intellectual property rights related to plant
genetic materials, at their core, are meant to prevent this exact practice. The
potential for competition from farmers incentivizes plant breeder to protect their
own rights at the expense of farmers' rights to improve profit margins. The
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See Gerstetter et al., supra note 56, at 267.
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See id.
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Id.at 269.
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Id
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See id.at 261.

174 See,for example, Chidi Oguamanam, Intellectual Propery Rights in Plant Genetic Resources: Farmers' Rights
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and Food Secunri of Indigenous and Local Communiies, 11 DRAKEJ. AGRIC. L. 273, 276 (2006).
See Winter, supra note 127, at 224.
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incentives also exist for plant breeders to lobby for intellectual property rights at
the expense of traditional farming practices. In many areas of the world, traditional
farming practices include saving seeds to reuse them in subsequent seasons
and/or trading seeds with other farmers in the local community.'76 However,
these practices can significantly erode a seed developer's profit because they allow
farmers to buy significantly fewer seeds."7 Even when a farmer is not directly in
competition with a seed producer, their rights are inherently framed in opposition.
Second, ITPGR and UPOV/TRIPS are challenging to implement together
in practice. This is because of the structure of the benefit-sharing system under
ITPGR's MLS. Benefit sharing under the MLS restricts IP rights and requires a
payment into the Multilateral System for benefits received from the
commercialization of any of its plant genetic resources. UPOV contains no
restrictions on which intellectual property rights can be claimed based on where
the genetic material came from; the only requirements are that the claimed plantbased rights have novel, distinct, uniform, and stable characteristics. This
difference makes integration of ITPGR into national laws that already comply
with UPOV and TRIPS challenging. To avoid this challenge, some scholars have
argued "that the prohibition on claiming IPRs contained in the [ITPGR] must be
understood not to prohibit the seeking of PBR for varieties that are derivatives of
the accession obtained from the MLS." 1 8 But this interpretation would only
protect the specific plant varieties accessed from the MLS, and not plant materials
derived from MLS sources. This is a relatively small pool of plant genetic resources
that is inconsistent with the spirit of the ITPGR.
Furthermore, this interpretation effectively invalidates an ambiguous part of
the ITPGR by simply ignoring that provision. The ITPGR's provision against
claiming intellectual property rights is vague. It prohibits claiming IP rights over
"genetic parts or components, in the form received" from the MLS. "' While there
is not a clear international understanding of what this language means, it seems
expansive in its protections of MLS material-including "parts and components"
rather than simply protecting entire plants.
Despite this, many plant breeders interpret the ITPGR restrictively to apply
only to specific varieties of plants accessed from the MLS rather than plant
materials. There is an even more fundamental tension between the treaties here.
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IP rights allow the owners to restrict access to a particular plant genetic material
fully. The ITPGR conflicts with such absolute control over plant genetic resources
derived from MLS materials, because the ITPGR requires facilitated access to all
plant genetic resources derived from MLS materials for research, breeding, and
training for food and agricultural production. 8 0 The required scheme of facilitated
access is incompatible with complete intellectual property rights over plant genetic
resources.
This analysis of the ITPGR and UPOV/TRIPS reveals a potential
implementation impasse concerning benefit sharing under the MLS. In practice,
this conflict is resolved by generally ignoring an undefined term in the ITPGR,
that is, "parts or components, in the form received." This pragmatic approach to
treaty interpretation follows the internal language of the treaties themselves.
However, this approach is problematic for the ITPGR because it significantly
diminishes its effectiveness and erodes the protections that it can offer.
Furthermore, it may contravene the Vienna Convention's requirement that
treaties be implemented and interpreted in good faith. The following section
offers some solutions that could allow a nation to implement the ITPGR in light
of TRIPS while still respecting the spirit of the ITPGR.
V. SUGGESTED INTERPRETATION
One possible solution is an interpretation of ITPGR that recognizes the
challenges of implementing the ITPGR in light of TRIPS. This section will
propose an interpretation of certain vague phrases in the ITPGR as a suggestion
for how both developed and developing nations can interpret the treaty
domestically and give it meaning during implementation. The interpretation will
be based in part on how the ambiguous phrases were understood by various
nations at implementation. It will aim to harmonize the discordant goals and
practices of the treaties. This Comment has four explicit goals in proposing this
interpretation: (1) to be consistent with the ITPGR's purpose (biological diversity
in plant genetic resources); (2) to avoid conflict with UPOV and TRIPS; (3) to
maintain a reasonable expectation of acceptability by both rich and poor member
nations of ITPGR; and (4) to clarify some of the unclear language in the ITPGR.
Interpreting the ITPGR to be more expansive than it practically is meets the first
of these goals. Taking into account the provisions of UPOV/TRIPS that might
conflict furthers the second goal. Achieving the third goal is trickiest:
interpretations of ITPGR that are too broad will lose support from developed
nations, whereas interpretations of 1TPGR that are too narrow will lose support
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from the least developed nations. The fourth goal is the inevitable result of a good
interpretation.
This interpretation is complicated by nations having vastly different sets of
obligations under the different treaty regimes addressed.18 TRIPS has different
implementation timelines for rich and poor nations, so some nations are bound
to provisions from which others are exempted. Furthermore, countries sometimes
voluntarily go beyond the requirements of TRIPS. Surprisingly, "[o]ver a third of
the WTO's 106 developing country members included a broad range of TRIPSplus provisions in their laws. Over half of the countries in this TRIPS-plus group
were [least developed countries] - the same countries that the economic literature
'
anticipates would adopt the lowest levels of IP protection."182
Often, these
TRIPS-plus provisions require nations to agree to become members of UPOV,
or agree to adopt language substantially similar to UPOV."8 Furthermore, nations
often exploit ambiguities in the language of the treaties to protect socially
important features domestically.
The ambiguity in the ITPGR is well known within the international
community. The first two vague phrases that this comment seeks to interpret"genetic parts or components" and "in the form received"-were crafted to be
deliberately vague as a compromise between developed and developing nations
that had different conceptions about the scope of the ITPGR. 8 4 Food-rich
developed nations preferred a narrow interpretation of ITPGR,8 5 favoring instead
robust protections for domestic companies producing plant-based genetic
materials for sale. The United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization
(UNFAO), which was instrumental in writing the ITPGR indicates that "[n]either
1 86
textual interpretation nor national jurisprudence is likely to resolve this debate."
As such, this Comment will consider the broadest and the narrowest
interpretations of the ambiguous phrases, representing respective preferences of
developing and developed nations. It will then propose a compromise between
the broadest and narrowest possible definitions. UNFAO instructs that "[i]n
interpreting Article 12.3(d), the Governing Body may seek advice from WIPO or
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the TRIPs Council. Alternatively, a dispute over the proper interpretation of the
provision may be submitted to arbitration or to the International Court of
Justice.""18 This implies that the ITPGR governing body could adopt any
interpretation of the ambiguous language it pleases.
A. Genetic Parts or Components
The ITPGR does not define what the term "genetic parts or components"
means. This is a crucial phrase for determining the scope of the ITPGR's
prohibition against claiming intellectual property rights on materials derived from
the Multilateral System. Specifically, this phrase will determine how large a piece
of genetic material must be in order to meet the ITPGR's prohibitions on claiming
intellectual property rights. 8 8 Currently, there is not a prevailing international
interpretation of this language; this is one of the features crippling the ITPGR.
This phrase is particularly challenging because it has viable interpretations
that are both broad and narrow. Developing nations tend to interpret this phrase
broadly, whereas developed nations tend to prefer a narrow definition.189 The
broadest definition of this phrase is that plant genetic material producers cannot
claim intellectual property rights for any plant part derived from MLS material.
This would include genetic materials that do not constitute an entire plant, such
as a strand of genetic material that constitutes a single plant characteristic. It would
also include claiming IP rights over any plant that contains any genetic materials
of a plant accessed from the MLS. For example, if a plant producer were to start
with corn from the MLS, no derivative of that corn could be claimed for
intellectual property protection as long as any part of the original genetic material
remained.
Conversely, the narrowest definition of "genetic parts or components"
would only indicate that plant producers cannot claim intellectual property rights
for any part of MLS material in the form received. Under the narrow definition,
any modification of the genetic resources from materials accessed in the MLS
would mean that those genetic "parts or components" could be claimed under
intellectual property law. Considering again corn taken from the MLS: any change
to the genetic code of the corn would mean that the entire corn derivative could
be patented. The broad definition ignores the benefit-sharing MLS provisions,
which anticipate some IP rights from MLS-derived plants. The broad definition
probably will not find support among rich nations, as it is contrary to current
practices.

187

Id.

188

For more on interpreting ambiguities in ITPGR provisions, see discussion and sources cited supra

189

Section III.
See Kennedy, supranote 55, at 28.

Vol. 16 No. 1

Plant Genetic Resources

The proposed interpretation for this phrase falls somewhere between the
broadest and the narrowest definition, and can be expressed as follows: a party
cannot claim intellectual property rights for any plant genetic resource that could
be found in its entirety in an MLS plant. In other words, any genetic material that
makes up a cognizable characteristic in any MLS plant cannot be claimed as
intellectual property. However, entire plants that use material from the MLS but
which have been modified could be claimed.19 ° This requires innovation from
plant producers to vary genetic resources in order to claim intellectual property
rights. As an example, consider again corn taken from the MLS. The corn in the
form taken from the MLS could not be claimed by anyone under a system of
intellectual property rights, and no specific part of the corn could be claimed.
However, if a breeder were to modify the corn to be more yellow, so long as the
gene that produces a more yellow corn met other IP rights requirements, and
couldn't be found in the original MLS corn or any other MLS corn products, then
it could be patented. So too could the whole corn seed producing the more yellow
corn. However, all of the other subparts of the corn, which were accessible in
MLS but have not been changed by the breeding process would not be protectable
under this proposed interpretation. The advantage of this suggested definition is
that it protects all of the genetic materials found in the MILS in whole and in part.
However, it also gives plant producers the incentives and freedom to protect their
intellectual property when they create a true innovation, even when that
innovation is derived from materials in the MLS.
The proposed definition draws support from a textual reading of a
declaration made by at least fourteen ITPGR parties upon ratification of the
treaty." 1 Nations can submit reservations, understandings, and declarations when
ratifying a treaty to indicate their understanding of the agreement, or to hedge
potentially objectionable readings of the text of the treaty. In the case of the
ITPGR, certain nations made a declaration "concerning the interpretation of
Article 12.3.d of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources as
recognising that plant genetic resources for food and agriculture or their genetic
parts or components which have undergone innovation may be the subject of
intellectual property rights provided that the criteria relating to such rights are
met." 19 2 This declaration indicated that these nations understand the term "genetic
parts or components" to allow some materials accessed from the MLS to be
190
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patented. Specifically, the text of the understanding supports allowing materials to
be patented in two instances. They are when plant genetic resources for food and
agriculture (that is, an entire plant's genetic code) has undergone innovation OR
when genetic parts or components (that is, part of a plant's genetic code) have
undergone innovation. This textual reading of the understanding comports with
the definition advanced above. That is, entire plants taken from the MLS that have
been innovated can be patented. So too can specific genes or characteristics that
have been changed from the form accessed under the MLS. Similarly, neither the
understanding nor the suggested interpretation allow for patents on any MLS
materials (in whole or in part) that have not been changed.
Many expected this ambiguity to be resolved in the standard material transfer
agreement (MTA) that the ITPGR requires in order for parties to access materials
from the MLS." 93 If the governing body of the ITPGR had adopted (or were to
adopt) a definition of "genetic parts or components", it could include that
definition in the definitions section of the MTA. An examination of the standard
MTA indicates that the governing body has yet to define this term."'
B. "In the Form Received"
The second path to a solution involves interpreting a line in the ITPGR that
has the potential to critically undermine the effectiveness of its farmers' rights
provisions. Article 12.3(d) of the ITPGR states: "Recipients shall not claim any
intellectual property or other rights that limit the facilitated access to the plant
genetic resources for food and agriculture, or their genetic parts or components,
in the form received from the Multilateral System."' 9 5 This section is plainly a
limitation on plant producers claiming intellectual property rights on plants
received from the MLS, but it leaves open the possibility that plant producers
could claim intellectual property rights on simple mutations or variations of plants.
However, "[b]ecause the ITPGR does not recognize any rights in individual
farmers or breeders who develop new plant varieties through systemic practices,
the 'in the form received' language works to substantially undermine the ITPGR's
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' During negotiations of the text of the ITPGR, the
famers' rights provisions."196
U.S. called to delete this language.' 97 Other developed nations interpret this
language in a very restricted way by functionally ignoring it. Standard farming
practices will generally result in seeds and plants changing over time. However,
the restrictive interpretation of the phrase "in the form received" makes farmers
engaging in standard farming practices vulnerable to intellectual property
infringement. The farmers are protected in using materials directly accessed from
MLS, but if their seeds develop after several seasons of use, they might be
innocently infringing on IP rights. 98 However, "in the form received" could be
interpreted broadly to include simple variations and changes resulting from
standard farming practices.' 99 This will use the ITPGR to fulfill its purpose, while
protecting farmers from infringing on protected plant varieties.20 0
A nation can implement this suggestion by crafting legislation to fulfill that
nation's obligations under TRIPS that is compatible with the suggested
interpretation. The organization that administers the ITPGR, the UNFAO,
released a study in 2004 examining the compatibility of TRIPS with farmers' rights
and other goals. 20 1 That study identified certain flexibility that nations have under
TRIPS and suggested various domestic legislation that could fulfill TRIPS
obligations but still allow a nation to pursue the protection of other socially
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valuable goals-including protecting plant varieties and farmers rights. 2 ' Most
notably, nations that are WTO members but not subject to UPOV requirements
can set their own requirements for plant patent eligibility when designing a sui
generis legal system.2 3 "[T]he four eligibility requirements of the UPOV-novelty,
distinctiveness, uniformity, and stability-have been criticized as unnecessarily
rigid, undervaluing plant genetic diversity and precluding IPR claims by traditional
farmers as opposed to commercial breeders. 20 4 By setting different patentability
requirements, the nations can exclude from patentability derivatives of MLS
materials "in the form received" as defined above. As part of this solution, a nation
could design sui generis legal protection that does not allow patents on plant
varieties that have been discovered, rather than developed. 2" This would assuage
the concern identified above about farmers accidentally infringing on IP rights by
using discovered plant varieties that are basic evolutions from MLS materials. The
UNFAO also suggested that nations could require plant breeders to provide a
declaration of the origin of the plant genetic material before granting a patent.2 6
One of the major values of this suggestion is that it "provides a check against
'biopiracy' by helping to identify breeders seeking protection of plant genetic
material that is widely known or used in other jurisdictions or found in ex situ
collections. 2 7 A declaration requirement could be used to help nations control
the patents granted domestically so that they are compatible with the aims of
ITPGR.
Brazil provides a compelling example of a nation using a patent-examination
process to comply with the TRIPS requirement of pharmaceutical patentability,
while simultaneously pursuing socially beneficial goals.20 8 While Brazil's domestic
legislation is different than that suggested above, Brazil's example grounds this
Comment's suggestion in empirical possibility.2 9 The Brazilian two-stage
examination process relies on two different agencies to each evaluate patent claims
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on plant genetic material.2" Each examination employs different criteria. The
second examination uses criteria with less technical sophistication."' 1 This system
allows the second agency to veto any pharmaceutical patent, despite an initial
determination that patentability was consistent with the technical requirements.2 12
Some nations have argued that this violates TRIPS Article 27.1,213 but it indicates
that nations can use domestic legislation implemented pursuant to TRIPS
requirements as a means of advancing the goals of the ITPGR. In order to do so,
however, the nations must first give meaning to ambiguous phrases in ITPGR.
C. Form and Manner of Payment
The ITPGR stipulates certain conditions under which plant producers must
make a payment to the Multilateral System. This payment is to be shared among
all of the member nations in a system of benefit sharing, so that all nations will
benefit from the commercialization of plant genetic materials derived from MLS
materials. However, "[w]hile the ITPGR ostensibly creates a mechanism for
sharing the benefits of commercialization, the form and manner of payment are
not delineated."214 Unlike the other areas of ambiguity discussed, this section was
probably deliberately left flexible to respond to the different needs of different
nations. The ITPGR provides some guidance about the intended beneficiaries of
benefit sharing: "[A]rticle 13.3 states that benefits resulting from the use of
PGRFA215 should flow primarily to farmers in all countries, especially in
developing countries and countries with economies in transition."2 6 The best
possible form and manner of payment could be put to the highest use by helping
farmers access necessary legal services.21 That is, the payments to the MLS could
be used to help farmers get assistance filing for patents, defending against patent
infringement suits related to plant genetic resources, etcetera. This is a very broad
interpretation of the language in the treaty, and there is no present practice to
support this part of the suggested interpretation; however, the goal of the
provision at issue is "benefit sharing" between member nations, and it is a benefit
to have farmers producing foods. They are functionally unable to compete in the
modern marketplace without occasional legal representation.
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VI. CONCLUSION
ITPGR and UPOV/TRIPS are important treaties that relate to the same
subject material but pursue widely different goals. All of these treaties are
important internationally and their overall purposes should be respected. The
suggested interpretation this Comment has advanced is an attempt to recognize
the challenges of implementing an important, albeit non-binding, treaty into
national law when constrained by a binding treaty with overlapping obligations.
That TRIPS is binding and ITPGR is not might indicate that the international
community normatively places more importance on protecting intellectual
property rights than plant genetic resource access rights. However, the existence
of the ITPGR indicates a general international recognition of the importance of
preserving diverse biological material for food production. Furthermore, the
ITPGR's ambiguities should not be interpreted in such a way that the treaty loses
all meaning, even though nations are under no legal obligation not to interpret it
that way. Instead, nations should adopt an interpretation of the ITPGR that gives
the treaty meaning in order to provide farmers a different kind of protection than
TRIPS can offer while still remaining faithful to TRIPS/UPOV's binding
commitments.
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